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Abstract. The focus of this paper is on the analysis of the cyber security
resilience of digital infrastructures deployed by power grids, internation-
ally recognized as a priority since several recent cyber attacks targeted
energy systems and in particular the power service. In response to the
regulatory framework, this paper presents an analysis approach based
on the Bayesian Networks formalism and on real world threat scenarios.
Our approach enables analyses oriented to planning of security measures
and monitoring, and to forecasting of adversarial behaviours.
1 Introduction
One of the key challenges for cyber security experts in charge of defending dig-
ital infrastructures from malicious activities is the capability to anticipate the
behaviour of their offensive counterparts. This permits to reinforce the defense
measures before the occurrence of the attack, and to increase the resilience of
cyber-physical systems such as those used for energy operations. In order to pro-
vide the desired capability, current research programs are developing new tools
for forecasting the attack probability and for the early detection of malicious
activities.
The focus of this paper is on the analysis of the cyber security resilience of
digital infrastructures deployed by power grids [22]. This issue is internationally
recognized as a priority since in the last years several cyber attacks targeted
energy systems and in particular the power service. Stuxnet, Dragonfly, Black
Energy and Industroyer are among the threats that affected industrial control
systems. The European member states have recently implemented the EU Net-
work and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2016/1148 regulating the cyber
security space of essential service operators.
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In response to the regulatory framework, this paper presents a methodology
developed in a just started research project that can be used both for selecting
the meaningful evidences of malicious actions and for investigating the causes of
attack effects. A probabilistic approach based on the Bayesian Networks formal-
ism has been selected as the best tool able to capture the various dependencies
of a very flexible cyber security model.
Our proposal enables different kinds of analyses. It can be used to spot vul-
nerabilities in the network that are most likely to lead to a compromise of signif-
icant impact, in order to correctly plan security measures. Also, it can be used
in evaluating the most appropriate monitoring configuration for detection of in-
trusions, by evaluating the sensors that are most likely to lead to the exposure of
significant threats. Finally, it is a tool that helps to forecast adversarial moves,
being able to deduce from observed behaviour the most likely threats.
The focus of this paper is on methodology but we also contribute an analysis
of attack patterns in the context of smart grids, with specific attention to the
way an intruder moves from the corporate part of the network to the more
sensible operational area. We also analyze a possible attack pattern directed to
disruption of grid functionality.
Our analysis combines its theoretical value with real-world data. Our attack
models are founded on a knowledge base of attack techniques [27], derived break-
ing down publicly reported incidents. Moreover probabilities of frequencies for
each attack step are derived from the same project [27] and from the the US
CERT-ORG vulnerabilities bulletin [9].
We assign a great value to early detection of attackers’ movements and there-
fore we integrate in our model monitoring aspects, once again derived from a
real-world project, [26].
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 presents the context
of the power system digital architecture, then Section 3 explains the modelling
methodology, and details the attack model. Section 4 illustrates some examples
of analyses that can be carried out. Finally Section 5 presents the conclusions
and some future works.
1.1 Related work
In the last twenty years several probabilistic approaches have been used for
developing cyber security assessment tools. This session discusses the approaches
related to the proposed methodology and clarifies the novelty of our contribution.
In our analysis we based estimates of the frequencies of attacks on data
extracted from the “Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge”
(ATT&CK) enterprise database from a MITRE project [21, 27], a knowledge
base compiled analyzing reports on real attacks.
A new knowledge base with data specific to Industrial Control System (ICS)
security breaches has been recently announced by MITRE [1] but has not been
made publicly available yet. Therefore, for estimates of frequencies of specific
power grid attacks we resorted to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [5], that provides a way to express on a 0-10 scale the severity of vulner-
abilities. See [4] and [11] for analyses and proposals on the use of CVSS based
metrics.
In parallel to the ATT&CK adversarial model, and based on its tactics and
analytics, MITRE has compiled the Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) [26], a
knowledge base focused on detection of ongoing attacks.
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are a widely used formalism for representing un-
certain knowledge in probabilistic systems, applied to a variety of real-world and
complex problems [15]. The adoption of BNs for security modeling has been ad-
vocated by several researchers [13, 16, 29, 2, 30, 7]. Such approaches start from at-
tack graph models to show how BNs can be derived, stressing the evidence-based
analysis allowed by such a formalism. In particular, in [7], attack graphs and BNs
are used to derive an overall security measure of a network. Attack graphs are
used to represent the causal relationships among attacks. Attack probabilities
are obtained using directly CVSS base scores, and in addition cumulative prob-
abilities are defined as a way to reflect in the metrics the causal relationship
between vulnerabilities. From the attack graph the authors derive BNs in order
to have probabilities that reflect interdependencies of events. In contrast, we base
most of our quantitative data on real world data from the MITRE ATT&CK
project, and model also detection mechanisms. We show that our model allows
different kinds of security analyses of the network to tackle both planning and
detection issues.
In [23] the authors build a BN on top of a graph that captures the security
dependencies of objects in the system, taking into account also evolution in time.
The aim of this research is security analysis of the network, and their specific in-
terest is identifying attack paths that make use of zero-day vulnerabilities. In [19]
the authors present a methodology for the cybersecurity analysis of Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructures. A predefined modelling
language is used to model ICT components, attack steps and defences. From
the model a large number of attack/defence graphs in the form of Bayesian-like
networks are automatically generated and the success rate of a given attack step
associated to a given architectural asset is evaluated as a function of the Time
to Compromise. Although the automatic generation of attack probabilities may
simplify the work of the analysts, the built-in attack steps and their logical de-
pendencies make it difficult to validate the underlying model and the analysis
results.
The new research [17] is related to our work since, as our approach, its
object is the security of a power grid network and it is based on the MITRE ICS
ATT&CK matrix. Their model is based on MITRE techniques and analytics, and
their goal is to determine the security level of the network in a time interval.
Other research targets in particular security of the smart grid or of ICS, with
an approach different from ours: in [12] the authors propose to use ensemble
classifiers to learn the (low entropy) benign traffic in a smart grid in order
to later detect anomalies; [8] introduces an attack chain specifically designed
for IIoT environments, that takes into account the multilevel architecture of
an ICS, and propose the use of machine learning classification techniques to
map security alerts to different phases of the attacks; in [28] graphs are used to
model cybersecurity properties on the smart grid and evaluate the effectiveness
of security mechanisms. In [18], the attention is restricted to attack detection
in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure; the study is based on the ADVISE
tool (see references in [18]) which allows to determine, based on a mechanism of
costs and rewards for the attacker, the most likely attack path in a given time
interval, along with probability of detection of the attack, and distinguishes
between different kinds of attackers. The approach is different, since it considers
detailed information on different classes of adversarial profiles, but it might in
future be integrated in our methodology.
2 IT/OT Architecture Description: IT/OT covergence
The evolution of the power grid towards a digitalized infrastructure requires to
address the cyber security aspects with paramount attention. The power sys-
Fig. 1. IT/OT architecture NIST 800-82 [20]
tem architecture evolves from isolated and proprietary systems with physical
separation of the areas to a layered architecture where components placed in
different domains have to interact. It is composed by several areas covering dif-
ferent domains coming from the business and corporate area moving to control
and process areas. Security characteristics and requirements vary across envi-
ronments, thus calling for a segmentation in different trust levels, called security
domains.
A reference model commonly used to represent the main layers of an ICS
is the Purdue model [14]. The components within each layer communicate by
means of local networks, and the communications between layers exploit possibly
heterogeneous technologies implementing local as well as wide area networks.
In some cases the latter are public connections deploying heterogeneous levels
of cyber security measures. Networks linked to other networks may introduce
common vulnerabilities spanning over multiple domains.
This paper addresses the analysis of cyber attack processes targeting an
IT/OT power system ICT architecture as presented in Figure 1. The architec-
ture comprises Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT)
components. It is not possible to clearly split the energy architecture in IT and
OT partitions since in the real world IT devices must interact with OT compo-
nents. In the same way, the cybersecurity analysis and implementations need to
address both IT and OT aspects in a comprehensive evaluation. So, starting from
the architecture in Figure 1, our analysis addresses a cyberattack process exploit-
ing the corporate area as entry point, passing through the different networks and
reaching the control and process environments. Indeed most ICS kill chains of
real cyber attacks occurred in the last years, targeting energy organizations, and
in particular electrical utilities, initiated from the IT network, more specifically
from the office/corporate network, and through the inter-domain connections
reached the OT control network.
The focus of our analysis is on attack processes exploiting the security
breaches of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the enterprise network (IT)
and the control network (OT). The DMZ is a basic cybersecurity measure nec-
essary in order to segregate two environments with very different cyber security
requirements and implemented security measures, but this is also a weak point
used by the attackers to reach the operational area. Our analysis covers the ar-
eas enclosed in dotted rectangles in Fig. 1 (the DMZ being marked by the lower
rectangle in the figure and the control area by the upper one) hosting the IT
and OT components employed in power monitoring and control activities.
3 Modeling
3.1 Methodology and tools
The information of the ATT&CK knowledge base [21, 27] is presented in a matrix
whose columns are labelled by tactics whereas the entries in each column are
techniques. A tactic can be viewed as a goal that the attacker is trying to attain
(e.g. Initial Access, Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, etc.); a technique
defines the means by which the attacker tries to attain its goal: for instance
Initial Access can be attained using Valid Accounts or a Spearphishing Link; on
the other hand Valid Accounts can be used also to attain Privilege Escalation.
Each technique is documented with a description, recommendations for mit-
igation and detection, and a list of references. In addition, for each technique
MITRE provides a list of actor groups that are known to have applied the tech-
nique, and a list of software (both malware and pen-testing tools) that make use
of it. MITRE also proposes a way of scoring the “popularity” of techniques in
the ATT&CK matrix [3], that can be visualized loading a json layer [24] on the
ATT&CK navigator [25]. The score is based on how often it has been reported
(i.e. the number of references in which it appears), how many groups have used it
and how many different software tools apply it. Notwithstanding the limitations
due to the lack of public accurate data on all attacks and to the error-prone
procedure of analyzing by hand existing reports, it is very attractive being able
to base the analysis on real-world data. Therefore we adopted the ATT&CK
scores as probabilities of technique occurrence, normalizing the scores in 0-1.
Since our focus is on the way a security breach can propagate to the OT envi-
ronment of a smart grid and there wreak havoc, we also used in our attack graph
techniques that are proper to the ICS world. Since the ICS ATT&CK matrix is
not yet available, in this case we derived our scores from the US Department of
Homeland Security’s ICS-CERT Advisories [9], selecting advisories on software
that is used in the electricity sector, limiting the analysis to advisories released
or revised in year 2015 or later and to those for which a Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) [5] score was provided. We processed the scores in or-
der to obtain metrics that reflect more accurately occurrence probabilities, i.e.
focusing on their Exploitability components.
In order to model aspects related to detection, we integrated in our model
also analytics from the Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) [26]. An analytic
describes events whose observation is significant to the security analyst. Among
all analytics listed, some are strong indications that a certain technique is being
deployed by an attacker (type “Tactic, Technique, Procedure” (TPP) analytics),
some are more general symptoms of a behavior not observed normally (type
“Anomaly”), others can be seen as indicators of the general health of the network
(type “Situational Awareness”). Monitoring these events enables to raise alerts of
varying levels of criticality. One single analytic is of type “Forensic” which means
that it is specifically useful as an investigation tool rather than to raise alerts
(not of interest to us and thus not used in the present context). Each analytic
is connected to the techniques (with a single exception) that the analytic helps
to expose.
3.2 Attack graphs
The typical attacks targeting energy and utility networks, comprise multistage
processes where the first phases rely on stealing administrative credentials. The
foothold in enterprise networks and the theft of administrative credentials al-
low the intruders to exploit administrative protocols and connections, to move
laterally and obtain information about the process environment. Then the re-
mote attacker is able to traverse the network and to perform malicious actions
targeting most critical areas of the power digital infrastructure.
The attack scenario under exam assumes that a workstation in the corporate
network has been already compromised. From there, the intruder attacks a host
located in the DMZ and then concentrates its efforts on a second host, in the OT
section. Once the latter host is compromised, the target of the attack may be a
service of the ICS subsystem. The attack graphs in Figs. 2 and 3 depict possible
attack paths: nodes represent states and edges transitions between states that
are enabled by the exploitation of some technique; the label of each edge is a
pair tactic/technique describing the specific ATT&CK technique that enables the
transition, as a vehicle for realizing the specified tactic.
Fig. 2. Lateral movement attack graph. Fig. 3. ICS service attack graph.
The multigraph of Fig. 2 is cyclic and describes the lateral movement from
one host to the next one. The shaded state represents both the initial state in
which the attacker has control of a generic host in the network and the goal
when, having followed one of the available paths, the attacker remotely con-
trols another machine in the network. The intruder may directly obtain root
privileges through the Lateral Movement tactic by means of the Exploitation of
Remote Services technique, and then can establish its Command and Control
channel using the Commonly Used Ports technique. Otherwise, she may gain
first a normal user access, and then escalate privileges. In this case, normal user
access can be achieved with three different attack patterns: one is via a dif-
ferent usage of Lateral Movement/Exploitation of Remote Services. The other
two patterns both achieve Credential Access either via Credential Dumping or
Exploitation for Credential Access; then the Lateral Movement is completed us-
ing the Remote Services technique combined with the use of a Valid Account
that provides Initial Access to the victim. Finally, from the initial state, if the
foothold of the attacker is a server, the attacker can exploit a vulnerability on
the server (Execution/Exploitation for Client Execution) and wait for a user (or
superuser) to fall in the trap and offer her access to the victim as user (or root),
as represented by dotted arcs in the figure. If the attacker has gained user access,
Fig. 4. BN model of the attack paths
then she will escalate privileges using Privilege Escalation/Bypass User Account
Control or via a Credential Access/Credential Dumping followed by a Privilege
Escalation/Valid Accounts. In all cases, the attacker concludes this phase of the
attack establishing Command and Control. So the attack graph of Fig. 2 models
a generic lateral movement and depending on the services possibly running on
the initial host or on the next victim, and on the overall setting, the attacker
can follow one or more attack paths. We will model an attack pattern in which
the attacker performs two lateral movements (two complete cycles in this attack
graph) from its initial foothold on a workstation in the corporate network, to a
server on the DMZ, and then to a server in the OT network.
The multigraph of Fig. 3 assumes that the attacker has control of a relevant
server on the OT network (“A controls OT server”). The goal is making the sys-
tem unstable (shaded node in the graph). In the scenario depicted, she can take
advantage of her position and either install a New Service or Modify an Exist-
ing Service (Persistence tactic) and then execute it (Execution/Service Execution
technique). The new service can be used to obtain Disruption or Destruction, us-
ing one of the techniques: Spoof Command Message or Spoof Reporting Message;
an existing service can be used for the same tactic using either Modify Command
Message, Modify Control Logic or Modify Reporting Message, depending on the
specific setting. These techniques can lead directly to an “Unstable power sys-
tem”, the final goal of the attacker. Or they can lead to a “Power grid state not
coherent” in which case a correct reaction of the system to wrong data leads to
the final goal. When the technique Modify Control Logic is used, then data are
still correct, but the reaction of the system is wrong, again leading to the final
attack goal.
3.3 Bayesian Network model
A Bayesian Network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical model where a Directed
Acyclic Graph is used to connect discrete random variables which are dependent
[10, 15]. The joint probability of the model can be obtained through a set of
conditional distributions which are locally specified at each variable node, with
respect to the set of parent nodes (i.e. the joint distribution is factorized by
means of the product of such local distributions). Because of that, any desired
conditional probability in the model can be computed, meaning that we can ask
for the probability of any variable (or set of variables), given that other variables
are observed (set to a specific state). We call the observed variable states the
evidence. From the attack scenarios depicted in Figs. 2 and 3, a BN can be
derived, as shown in Fig. 4 where nodes correspond to the involved techniques
and the states of the system, while arcs correspond to dependency relations that
take the form of cause-effect relations (if A causes or produces B, then an arc
is drawn from node A to node B). In our model, each node is binary: value 0
(false) indicates that the state or the technique has not occurred; value 1 (true)
indicates the occurrence of the state or the technique. In Fig. 4 three subnets can
be identified and represent the attack paths to the DMZ host, to the OT host,
and to the ICS service, respectively. The first two represent instances of attacks
that follow paths from the attack graph in Fig. 2. The third one represents an
instance of the attack graph in Fig. 3. We explain in detail how the first subnet
is obtained from the attack graph.
DMZ host. If we concentrate on the subnet modeling the attack to DMZ,
we can notice that success of the attack (node DMZhost) may be caused by
four techniques: Exploitation of Remote Service (node ExpRemServRoot), By-
pass User Account Control (node BypassUser), Valid Account (node ValAccRoot),
User Action (node Malware1). The first technique does not need the execution of
previous attack steps in order to be exploited; therefore the node ExpRemServ-
Root has no parent nodes. The other techniques, instead, can be executed only
if previous steps have been successfully performed. Let us consider the Bypass
User Account Control (node BypassUser); it needs a normal user access (node
UserAccess) which in turn may be caused by the Exploitation of Remote Service
(node ExpRemServUser), by a User Action (node Malware2), or by the contem-
porary successful execution of two techniques: Remote Service (node RemServ)
and Valid Account (node ValAccUser). Both techniques are enabled by a normal
user access (node CredUser) which can be achieved by means of the Credential
Dumping technique (node CredDump) or the Exploitation for Credential Access
(node ExpCredAcc). The Valid Account technique (node ValAccRoot) requires
access to root credentials (node RootDump), which in turn needs a normal user
access (node UserAccess) obtained as described above. Finally, both User Ac-
tions (nodes Malware1, Malware2) are enabled by the technique Exploitation for
Client Execution (node ExpCliExec).
Analytics. The BN model in Fig. 4 can be extended in order to include
the analytics, events possibly signaling the occurrence of a set of techniques.
For each analytic we add a node whose parent nodes correspond to the involved
techniques. The analytics nodes are again binary: 0 expresses that the analytic
has not occurred; 1 represents the occurrence. For example, the analytic Re-
mote Desktop Logon may indicate the execution of the Valid Account technique
at normal or root user level. Therefore the parent nodes of RemDeskLog are
ValAccUser and ValAccRoot.
CPT. The conditional distribution of a node n is locally specified by means of
the conditional probability table (CPT) which provides for each possible value
of n its occurrence probability, given any possible combination of the parent
nodes’ values. The CPT of technique-nodes without parents, such as ExpRem-
ServRoot or ExpCredAcc, include only independent probabilities. Such values are
the a priori probabilities of technique occurrence and are derived from the nor-
malized scores, as explained in Section 3.1. When a technique-node has at least
one parent, the definition of the CPT is required. For instance the conditional
probabilities of the node ByPassUser depend on the values of UserAccess, since
the technique Bypass User Account Control requires (unprivileged) user access
to be exploited. In particular, ByPassUser is surely 0 when UserAccess is 0; in
case UserAccess is 1, ByPassUser is 1 with probability p, and 1 − p otherwise.
In this case p = 0.9779785432 and it is the probability of occurrence of By-
pass User Account Control estimated from its score. For the definition of the
analytic-nodes, such as RemDeskLog, we make the simplifying assumption that
all the analytics are “perfect” meaning that they raise an alert if and only if
at least one of the monitored techniques was used. In a BN such behavior can
be represented by an OR-gate that allows us to derive, for all combinations of
parent nodes’ values, the correspondent conditional probability according to the
OR operator semantics.
4 Analysis
Several kinds of analyses (inferences) can be perfomed on a BN. In general,
the probability distribution of the values of any node (queried variable) can be
computed. The computation can be conditioned by the observation of the value
(state) of any set of other nodes in the BN (observed variables or evidence). In
a predictive analysis the observed variable represents a cause, and the queried
variable an effect. In a diagnostic one, the observed variable represents an effect,
and the queried variable a cause. In a mixed diagnostic/predictive analysis both
causes and effects of a set of queried variables are part of the evidence. In the BN
modeling our attack graph, the variables representing attack goals (DMZhost,
OThost, ICS), and those representing analytics can be considered as effects,
while those representing techniques can be considered as causes.
In our context, an interesting predictive analysis is the probability of a suc-
cessful attack, given the observation of a set of analytics, since it is a guide for
interpreting alerts for early detection of intrusions. Tab. 1 shows the probability
of a successful attack to DMZ host, OT host, and ICS service, conditioned by
five different evidence sets (ES) of analytics’ occurrences. For all sets, the proba-
bility of compromise of the DMZ host is the highest because it is the first goal to
be reached by the attacker, while the other goals (OT host, ICS service) require
further steps in order to be achieved. We can forecast adversarial threats, after
early detection of a first security breach: if the DMZ host has been compromised,
Goal ES1 ES2 ES3 ES4 ES5
DMZhost 0.1413388 0.1384550 0.1280185 0.1261751 1.0000000
OThost 0.0200506 0.0196415 0.0176786 0.015602 0.1236536
ICSservice 0.0001628 0.0001594 0.0001435 0.0000000 0.0000000
Table 1. Compromise probabilities given different evidence sets. (ES1: no analytics
deployed. ES2: only DMZ analytics deployed, no alerts raised. ES3: only DMZ and
OT analytics deployed, no alerts raised. ES4: all analytics deployed, no alerts raised.
ES5: all analytics deployed, only DMZ’s DLL inject [6] raises an alert.)
Technique Prob. Analytic Prob.
BypassUser 0.021764 DLLInject 0.021764
CredDump 0.0717119 EventMonitor 0.0127349
ExpCredAcc 0.342749 QuickExec 0.0717119
ExpRemServRoot 0.0359553 RemDeskLog 0.0127349
ExpRemServUser 0.0057617 RPCAct 0.0150849
RemServ 0.0024305 SimLogHost 0.0127349
RootDump 0.0364453 SMBCopyExec 0.0127349
ValAccRoot 0.0019609 SMBWriteReq 0.0127349
ValAccUser 0.010796 SuspArg 0.0736954
UserLogActMon 0.0127349
UserLogMulti 0.0127349
Table 2. Probabilities of techniques and analytics given compromise of DMZ host
the attacker will likely target the OT host, since the probability for the OT host
is 0.1418621, for the ICS service 0.0011515.
The probability that a set of techniques has been applied, given the obser-
vation of the success of attacks to DMZ, OT, or ICS, can be used as a guide for
implementing effective countermeasures. In Tab. 2 we show the probabilities of
techniques and analytics given the observation that the DMZ host is compro-
mised. Among all techniques, the most probable one is ExpCredAcc, so it may
be considered as the most relevant cause, and accordingly appropriate measures
should be adopted to protect the network from such an attack. Tab. 2 shows that
the most probable analytics, given the observation of the success of attacks to
DMZ, OT, or ICS, are SuspArg (Suspicious Arguments) and QuickExec (Quick
Execution of Suspicious Commands). This means that installing sensors for these
analytics should be a cost effective detection strategy.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a promising methodology to analyze and assess the cyber se-
curity posture of a typical power system ICT infrastructure. The model allows us
to perform several types of analysis that could be used to plan the development
of the security measures in terms of defense countermeasures and abnormal evi-
dence collection. Moreover the assessment of the probability of attack processes
involving different areas and in particular the point of connection between them
(in this case the DMZ network), could be used to forecast the status of the
infrastructure and detect possible active cyber attacks.
Bayesian Networks and their extensions represent, indeed, a useful formal-
ism to model complex environments, as the ICT power system infrastructure,
to perform cyber security analyses. This methodology can be extended in order
to deploy the ability of the Bayesian Network to perform predictive and diag-
nostic analysis. Together with data coming from a laboratory environment, the
approach could be used to identify evidences helpful to detect attack steps, thus
effectively enriching the knowledge base used by the model. Another possible
application of this methodology is to assess the effectiveness of the implemen-
tation of specific countermeasures in order to contrast the evolution of attack
processes.
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